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Abstract The COVID-19 pandemic presents unprece-
dented challenges to public health decision-making.
Specifically, the lack of evidence and the urgency with
which a response is called for, raise the ethical challenge
of assessing how much (and what kind of) evidence is
required for the justification of interventions in response
to the various threats we face. Here we discuss the
intervention of introducing technology that aims to trace
and alert contacts of infected persons—contact tracing
(CT) technology. Determining whether such an inter-
vention is proportional is complicated by complex trade-
offs and feedback loops. We suggest that the resulting
uncertainties necessitate a precautionary approach. On
the one hand, precautionary reasons support CT tech-
nology as a means to contribute to the prevention of
harms caused by alternative interventions, or COVID-
19 itself. On the other hand, however, both the extent to
which such technology itself present risks of serious
harm, as well as its effectiveness, remain unclear. We
therefore argue that a precautionary approach should put
reversibility of CT technology at the forefront. We
outline several practical implications.
Keywords Public health ethics . Risk, Precautionary
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It has been suggested that it could be morally justified, or
even morally obligatory, to implement contact tracing
technology (CT technology) in the response to the current
COVID-19 pandemic (Parker et al. 2020). There are dif-
ferent ways of implementing CT technology, but they all
aim to retrospectively trace and alert contacts of confirmed
infected persons (Rimpiläinen, Thomas, and Morrison
2020). Like any other form of surveillance, CT technology
raises privacy issues. However, given the enormous risks
and burdens associated with either ongoing population
lockdowns, or letting the virus spread freely, some in-
fringement of privacy may be considered proportional
(Schaefer and Ballantyne 2020). This raises the question
of what an acceptable trade-off would be. What is a
reasonable price to pay to help mitigate some of the worst
effects of the global crisis?
Epistemic Uncertainties
There are no easy answers to the question of the pro-
portionality of CT technology or any of the other possi-
ble surveillance interventions. Attempts to deal with the
various threats posed by the pandemic are hindered by
epistemic uncertainties on different levels (Aven and
Bouder 2020). The social, economic, and health risks
associated with the pandemic are largely unknown and
are systemically interrelated: in many cases addressing
one risk will have effects on the probability and weight
of the others (Hafiz et al. 2020). Worse still, there is not
much room for experiments, the crisis is acute, and an
overly hesitant approach may aggravate the situation,
just as an overly rushed one could.
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This challenge can be interpreted within a precau-
tionary framework: lockdowns have been implemented
across the globe by way of precaution against a rise in
infection, which would lead to sickness, death, and
potential overload of healthcare systems. However,
since these lockdowns come at a great cost and present
risks of their own (Hoffmann et al. 2020), questions
arise on how long and to what extent these restrictions
may be justified (Viens et al. 2009; Selgelid 2014). CT
technology is presented as one tool to move beyond
blanket lockdowns, contributing to the prevention of
both the damage associated with COVID-19 directly
and the consequences of responses to it (Parker 2020).
The complexity of the situation affects decision-
making on proposed interventions. As we will illustrate,
in determining the desirability of CT technology we are
confronted by difficult trade-offs and feedback loops,
the assessment of which is hindered by the overall
epistemic uncertainty.
Trade-offs and Feedback Loops
First, on the level of the app itself, there appears to be a
trade-off between responsible data use and effective-
ness. Responsible data use requires sufficient guarantees
that data is stored and treated in a way that prevents
abuse and protects privacy (Bock et al. 2020). For this
reason, so-called decentralized approaches have been
proposed as a way to protect users from the dangers of
privacy infringement (Troncoso et al. 2020, see
however Vaudenay 2020 for a discussion of the risks
to privacy inherent to decentralized approaches). In-
creased privacy, however, is likely to decrease effective-
ness. CT technology may be less potent as a public
health tool when users and providers are unable to use
identifying characteristics. For example, false positives
may increase when the technology itself is unable to
distinguish people who have been in close contact from
those who were separated by a wall and there is no
additional information available to put the results into
context (European Commission 2020). These false pos-
itives risk further burdening an already overburdened
healthcare system and might create anxieties or lead to
unnecessary self-isolation. In addition, decentralized al-
ternatives appear to be more vulnerable to trolling,
where individuals purposefully feed the system with
false information, as well as to plain human fallibility,
where people accidentally do so. It appears that there
may be good reasons from a public health perspective to
store data in a way that provides access to aggregated
and individualized data to track infection. Such mass
storage of location data may be better suited to support
analogous contact tracing practices, but it would also
likely be prone to leaks and abuses. Furthermore, a
centralized approach increases the risk of function
creep, which occurs when data is used for other pur-
poses than initially intended (Bock et al. 2020). Poten-
tially, the infrastructure that is created in battling the
pandemic enables governments, or private companies,
to exercise an inordinate amount of control over indi-
vidual citizens. For these reasons, a centralized approach
needs a stronger justification in terms of a substantial
increase of effectiveness, the evidence of which will be
very difficult to establish.
Second, on the level of societal implementation, the
complexities of CT technology can be illustrated by
issues of uptake and voluntariness. Effectiveness can
only be ensured if the uptake is sufficiently high (Cho,
Ippolito and Yu 2020). However, not all citizens own a
(sufficiently new) smartphone necessary to run an app
(Gasser et al. 2020). Hardware may be distributed, in the
form of keychains or cards, but this will be costly.
Additionally, in a voluntary scheme, many people who
do own a smartphone may refuse to install the app,
because they (rightly or wrongly) fear that they may
be hacked or controlled, because they do not wish to be
forced to isolate, or because they think their contribution
is not needed (Wong and Jensen 2020). If the perceived
disadvantages are relatively high, motivation to partici-
pate will likely be low. This adds a layer to the trade-off
between effectiveness and privacy discussed above. Es-
pecially if it’s suspected that there is a high number of
false positives, and people would be isolating them-
selves “for nothing,” the individual costs might over-
shadow the perceived public benefits. The extent and
weight of these disadvantages will depend on the wider
context, which is formed by the availability of proper
follow up, income protection insurance, and so on.
Trust in the prevailing system is another important
factor (Ienca and Vayena 2020). However, trust may be
negatively affected precisely by attempts to influence
uptake, by either mandating participation or by incen-
tivizing it. For example, the uptake may be increased if,
as a counter-balance to the perceived disadvantages,
there are relative advantages offered to the instalment
and use of CT technology, for instance when the en-
trance to certain public spaces (restaurants, public
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transportation, stores) is conditional on participation
(Lucivero 2020). These approaches need a stronger justi-
fication than voluntary ones, because they constitute a
larger infringement of individual rights (EDPB 2020).
Yet, they may be more difficult to justify for at least two
reasons. Firstly, offering advantages will likely exacerbate
inequalities. Even if we can arrange that everybody has
access to the relevant technology, not everybody will be
affected in the same way: people who are unable to work
from home, who are in contact with many strangers, and
who do not have the resources to easily self-isolate will be
disproportionately affected. Secondly, (semi-) mandatory
approaches may in some cases even create perverse incen-
tives, for example when people are motivated to “chase
immunity” in order to escape the burdens of the app. Any
attempt to encourage or mandate CT apps is then likely to
worsen the situation, by creating backlash effects that
cause CT technology to lose support of large parts of the
population (Munthe and Nijsingh 2019). It is precisely
because of the potential benefit of being able to trace the
spread of the virus more easily and pervasively than with
the labour intensive method of contacting people person-
ally that we may expect the chances of these kinds of
effects to rise.
Attempts to responsibly introduce CT technology are
thus confronted with feedback loops: low effectiveness
raises costs and decreases uptake, attempts to counter
this by raising effectiveness may decrease privacy,
which then potentially decreases uptake, while raising
uptake by implementing more or less mandatory ap-
proaches creates risks of backlash and crumbling public
support, which then again lowers effectiveness. Of
course, scenarios where positive reinforcing feedback
loops take place are also possible. A fair and reliable
system would lead to an increase in trust and potentially
a shared feeling of solidarity, which will lead to a further
increase in use and therefore effectiveness, etc. The
problem is, we do not know the relative weight and
probability of the different factors in play.
Precautionary Principle
Due to the complexity and various types of uncer-
tainties, any course of action, as well as abstaining from
action, may potentially have grave consequences—
while there is little time to thoroughly research the
various options. This mix of uncertainty, complexity,
and urgency raises the ethical challenge of assessing
how much (and what kind of) evidence is required for
the justification of interventions in response to the var-
ious threats we face. This is a familiar challenge in
discussions on the precautionary principle (Steel 2015;
Munthe 2011).
The precautionary principle (PP) is based on the tenet
that uncertainty is not a sufficient reason to abstain from
taking precautions to prevent some adverse outcome.
Usually, responsible applications of PP will set lower
standards of evidence to the extent that the potential
damage that the precaution aims to prevent is serious
and/or irreversible (Trouwborst 2009). This point of
departure can be detailed in various ways, by balancing
the expected adverse outcome to the precaution and the
level of uncertainty (Steel 2015). One basic requirement
to this balancing is proportionality. If PP is to be of any
use as a practical guidance to responsible policy deci-
sion-making, it needs to be fleshed out in a way that is
non-arbitrary and consistent. A non-arbitrary version of
PP allows principled comparison between different pre-
cautions. It demands that when one precaution is pre-
ferred over another, this is done on the basis of general-
izable reasons, for example those relating to costs, ex-
pected side effects or expected effectiveness. Consisten-
cy, moreover, demands that a version of PP that recom-
mends a certain precaution does not at the same time
recommend against that precaution. In a presently apt
metaphor, the cure should not be worse than the disease
(Singer and Plant 2020).
However, as we have seen, in complex messy con-
texts such as the COVID-19 pandemic, it is not always
clear what proportionality demands (cf. Nijsingh
forthcoming). The proportionality of CT technology
will vary depending on contextual factors: How sensi-
tive and specific are non-digital contact tracing mea-
sures and what risks are posed by these measures? What
is the current level of community transmission of the
virus? What is the general level of trust in infectious
disease measures or in digital technology? Where is the
CT technology introduced (dense cities or spread out
rural areas)? Who decides whether CT technology is
sufficiently effective and safe? Some of these contextual
factors are dynamic, others are of a more permanent
nature, some are local, some are universal and some
are more or less empirically certain. Whether or not a
CT technology will be justified depends on both which
type exactly is being proposed and the context within
which it is introduced. This makes it very difficult to
predict whether CT technology will contribute to the
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solution, or rather make matters worse (cf. Morley et al.
2020). There is a strong imperative to conduct research
in order to gather more evidence (Wild et al. 2020;
Lucivero et al. 2020). But decisions need to be made
now and even when more information is available, the
situation will still be fraught with uncertainty. This
uncertainty dramatically increases the chances of “get-
ting it wrong.”
Our suggestion in this situation of epistemic uncer-
tainty is not to abandon hope for a reasoned approach
but to aim to keep one’s options open as much as
possible. Since the current pandemic poses a multiface-
ted problem, there will be no “golden bullet” solution,
rather some interventions may work well in some con-
texts or only in combination with specific other inter-
ventions. Note that, even though some of the trade-offs
we described are specific to CT technology, uncertainty
applies to many other interventions as well, including
other types of contact tracing. These interventions pose
risks of their own, which makes it even more difficult to
give a balanced assessment of what the right course of
action is likely to be. Given the lack of evidence, the
need to act quickly and a precautionary requirement to
prevent serious and irreversible harm, the importance of
the reversibility of the precautions themselves increases
(Nijsingh forthcoming). Although this formulation does
not offer a clear cut-off point, reversibility could be
interpreted as a threshold criterion: when, in a complex
and urgent situation, the reversal of a precaution is
impossible, likely to be very costly, or disruptive, this
offers a weighty, principled reason against this precau-
tion. As the available evidence accumulates, a situation
may arise in which one may more confidently choose an
option that is less easily reversed. However, our discus-
sion suggests that the prospect of even retrospectively
determining a single best course of action is not great,
which means that it is important not to be overconfident
in implementing precautions.
Practical Implications
The focus on reversibility has several practical
implications:
& Public policy should have sunset provisions and
should clearly describe how the temporary character
of the surveillance is to be guaranteed.
& Any responsible implementation of CT technology
should give special weight to systemic risks, for ex-
ample creating or exacerbating power asymmetries or
the risk of creating or reinforcing monopolies.
& Reversibility provides an argument not to integrate
CT technology into existing infrastructures: a
keychain or card is prima facie preferable to an
app that is installed on a smartphone. Specifically
designated hardware may be easily discarded and
plausibly has a relatively small impact on existing
power distributions.
& Evidence should be acquired in local experiments,
rather than nationally or even internationally rolling
out possible solutions.
& The focus on reversibility also gives strong reasons
not to presume effectiveness of CT apps in general.
Different governments and private institutions have
currently committed to digital CT, mostly without
detailing the specific properties that would deter-
mine effectiveness, and without describing how ef-
fectiveness would be enhanced by other measures.
This approach runs the risk of excluding consider-
ations, which hinders a proper balancing of contex-
tual factors.
Note that the fluidity of the current situation suggests
that none of these implications is etched in stone and
that they could themselves be subject to revision. Any
plausible approach to the complex and urgent problems
that we now face will, however, need to take reversibil-
ity into account.
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